When using SECMARK, the administrator configures the iptables or netfilter rules to add a label to the packet data structure (on the host itself) that can be governed through SELinux policies. Unlike peer labeling, here the labels assigned to the network traffic is completely locally defined. Consider the following command …more ...
Allow me to start with an important warning: I don't have much hands-on experience with the remainder of this post. Its based on the few resources I found on the Internet and a few tests done locally which I've investigated in my attempt to understand SELinux policy writing for networking …more ...
Let's talk about how SELinux governs network streams (and how it reflects this into the policy).
When you don't do fancy stuff like SECMARK or netlabeling, then the classes that you should keep an eye on are tcp_socket and udp_socket (depending on the protocol). There used to be node and …more ...
metadata.xml file syntax definition (the DTD for those
that know a bit of XML) has been updated to support CPE definitions. A
CPE (Common Platform Enumeration) is an
application, operating system or hardware device using its vendor,
product name, version, update, edition and …
When using virtualization extensively, you will pretty soon hit the limits of your system (at least, the resources on it). When the virtualization is used primarily for testing (such as in my case), the limit is memory. So it makes sense to seek memory optimization strategies on such systems. The …more ...
Many services on a Linux system use a
*.d directory approach to make
their configuration easily configurable by other services. This is a
remarkably simple yet efficient method for exposing services towards
other applications. Let's look into how this
.d approach works.
Take a look at the
Being long overdue - like many of our documentation-reported bugs :-( I worked on bug 466262 to update the Gentoo Handbook with information about Network Interface Naming. Of course, the installation instructions have also seen the necessary updates to refer to this change.
With some luck (read: time) I might be able …more ...
In previous posts I talked about capabilities and gave an introduction to how this powerful security feature within Linux can be used (and also exploited). I also covered a few capabilities, so let's wrap this up with the remainder of them.
As I've (in a very high level) described capabilities and talked a bit on how to work with them, I started with a small overview of file-related capabilities. So next up are process-related capabilities (note, this isn't a conform terminology, more some categorization that I do myself).