Simplicity is a form of art...

A SELinux policy for incron: using booleans

After using a default set of directories to watch, and allowing admins to mark other types as such as well, let's consider another approach for making the policy more flexible: booleans. The idea now is that a boolean called incron_notify_non_security_files enables incrond to be notified on changes on all possible …

A SELinux policy for incron: marking types eligible for watching

In the previous post we made incrond able to watch public_content_t and public_content_rw_t types. However, this is not scalable, so we might want to be able to update the policy more dynamically with additional types. To accomplish this, we will make types eligible for watching through an attribute.

So how …

A SELinux policy for incron: default set

I finished the last post a bit with a cliffhanger as incrond is still not working properly, and we got a few denials that needed to be resolved; here they are again for your convenience:

type=AVC msg=audit(1368734110.912:28353): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=9716 comm="incrond …

A SELinux policy for incron: the incrond daemon

With incrontab_t (hopefully) complete, let's look at the incrond_t domain. As this domain will also be used to execute the user (and system) commands provided through the incrontabs, we need to consider how we are going to deal with this wide range of possible permissions that it might take. One …

A SELinux policy for incron: new types and transitions

So I've shown the iterative approach used to develop policies. Again, please be aware that this is my way of developing policies, other policy developers might have a different approach. We were working on the incrontab command, so let's continue with trying to create a new user incrontab:

$ incrontab -e …

A SELinux policy for incron: basic set for incrontab

Now that our regular user is allowed to execute incrontab, let's fire it up and look at the denials to build up the policy.

$ incrontab --help

That doesn't show much does it? Well, if you look into the audit.log (or avc.log) file, you'll notice a lot of denials …

A SELinux policy for incron: our first interface

The next step after having a basic skeleton is to get incrontab running. We know however that everything invoked from the main daemon will be running with the rights of the daemon context (unless we would patch the source code, but that is beyond the scope of this set of …

A SELinux policy for incron: the basic skeleton

So, in the previous post I talked about incron and why I think moving it into the existing cron policy would not be a good idea. It works, somewhat, but is probably not that future-proof. So we're going to create our own policy for it.

In SELinux, policies are generally …

A SELinux policy for incron: what does it do?

In this series of posts, we'll go through the creation of a SELinux policy for incron, a simple inotify based cron-like application. I will talk about the various steps that I would take in the creation of this policy, and give feedback when certain decisions are taken and why. At …

Why oh why does a process run in unlabeled_t?

If you notice that a process is running in the unlabeled_t domain, the first question to ask is how it got there.

Well, one way is to have a process running in a known domain, like screen_t, after which the SELinux policy module that provides this domain is removed from …