Yesterday evening (UTC, that is) the members of the Gentoo Hardened project filled the #gentoo-hardened IRC channel again - it was time for another online follow-up meeting.


A few patches on the toolchain need to be created to mark SSP as default, but this is just a minor workload.

And on the ASAN (Address Sanitizer) debacle; well... still the same. Doesn't work with PaX. I think there is a standstill on this.

Kernel, grsecurity/PaX

It is not clear yet what the next LTS (Long Term Stable) kernel will be that the grSecurity team will support. This depends on the Ubuntu LTS support, and as it is not clear which kernel that distribution will use for LTS, the grSecurity team can also not say what kernel it will be. (So please stop asking ;-)

grsecurity 3.0 is out, with the following commit message:

commit 4f48151d49f2697c3e2e108a50513a8d61fb150d
Author: Brad Spengler 
Date:   Sun Nov 24 17:47:14 2013 -0500

    Version bumped to 3.0 (we'd been on 2.9.1 for way too long and numerous
    features have been added since then)

    Introduce new atomic RBAC reload method, developed as part of sponsorship
    by EIG

    This is accompanied by an updated 3.0 gradm which will use the new reload
    method when -R is passed to gradm.  The old method will still be available
    via gradm -r (which is what a 2.9.1 gradm will continue to use).

    The new RBAC reload method is atomic in the sense that at no point in the
    reload process will the system not be covered by a coherent full policy.
    In contrast to previous reload behavior, it also preserves inherited subjects
    and special roles.

    The old RBAC reload method has also been made atomic.  Both methods have
    been updated to perform role_allowed_ip checks only against the IP tagged
    to the task at the time its role was first applied or changed.  This resolves
    long-standing usability problems with the use of role_allowed_ip and matches
    the policies created by learning.

The new version requires the use of >=gradm-3.0. Some hardened-sources packages already contain the 3.0 patchset (currently in testing). In a few days, a final hardened-sources with a 2.9.1 patchset will be stabilized; after that, only 3.0 patchset sources will be used.

Another open issue (for a while) is the wrapper used to properly pax-mark binaries during package building (instead of post-merge changes). Although it works functionally well, it has serious performance regressions when hundreds of files need to be merged and marked. For each file, the Python interpreter is launched again, making this a very time-consuming effort. Blueness is currently working on a C-based wrapper which should load much faster.


The live repository of the Gentoo Hardened policies is well up to date with the latest evolutions of the reference policy. If you want to use these, use the -9999 ebuilds for the SELinux policy packages. This can be accomplished with the following line in package.accept_keywords:

sec-policy/* **

Recently, revision 5 of the SELinux policies has been pushed to the tree (currently in testing). This one also contains a few required changes to the policy for the new userspace utilities which are also now available in the tree. An important update on the new userspace utilities is that they contain many of the patches we needed in Gentoo and of course the necessary updates, patches and improvements all-round. Once the SELinux policies are stabilized, the userspace utilities will be too.

After a few successful runs with SELinux on ARM devices, we will most likely be tagging our SELinux packages (policies and userspace utilities) as ~arm. Documentation will need to be updated on this as well, not only to cater for the additional keyword, but also because of one (perhaps a few) changes needed, like fixing the SELinux binary policy (as most ARM systems come with a lower kernel version).

SELinux support on ZFS also seems to work well, with the last patches in (thanks to prometheanfire).

As a final aspect, the SELinux eclass in Gentoo Linux now also supports fetching the latest policy sources from git through HTTP (instead of git/ssh).


Not much to discuss here; IMA/EVM and kernel signing all work well.

In the next few days/weeks, I will be working on a Gentoo Security Benchmark as a sort-of follow-up (improvement) of the current Gentoo Security Handbook, now using SCAP methods.


There has been discussion about supporting a hardened desktop profile in Gentoo again. This does come with the nasty surprise that these profiles don't play well together, so a solution needs to be brought in place. This could be a "hardened desktop" profile separate from the gentoo desktop one (and as such manually synchronized), or an improved approach on profile stacking.

One idea was to support stacking with a maximum depth, allowing to use changes made by a profile without inheriting the changes that that profile inherited to a certain extend.

Another idea is to use a more dependency-based syntax (similar to OpenRC dependency system for init scripts), which not only allows for proper stacking and the necessary flexibility, but also improves readability:

before {
after {
depends {

The next few months will be interesting to see how this will evolve ;-)


All our documents are on the wiki, so if you notice gaps or see possibilities for improvement - by all means, do them.

All in all a good session. Thanks for the good work guys!


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