Another month has passed, so time to mention again what we have all been doing lately ;-)
Version 4.8 of GCC is available in the tree, but currently masked. The package contains a fix needed to build hardened-sources, and a fix for the asan (address sanitizer). asan support in GCC 4.8 might be seen as an improvement security-wise, but it is yet unclear if it is an integral part of GCC or could be disabled with a configure flag. Apparently, asan “makes building gcc 4.8 crazy”. Seeing that it comes from Google, and building Google Chromium is also crazy, I start seeing a pattern here.
Anyway, it turns out that PaX/grSec and asan do not get along yet (ASAN assumes/uses hardcoded userland address space size values, which breaks when UDEREF is set as it pitches a bit from the size):
ERROR: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0x20000001000 (2199023259648) bytes at address 0x0ffffffff000
Given that this is hardcoded in the resulting binaries, it isn’t sufficient to change the size value from 47 bits to 46 bits as hardened systems can very well boot a kernel with and another kernel without UDEREF, causing the binaries to fail on the other kernel. Instead, a proper method would be to dynamically check the size of a userland address.
However, GCC 4.8 also brings along some nice enhancements and features. uclibc profiles work just fine with GCC 4.8, including armv7a and mips/mipsel. The latter is especially nice to hear, since mips used to require significant effort with previous GCCs.
Kernel and grSecurity/PaX
More recent kernels have now been stabilized to stay close to the grSecurity/PaX upstream developments. The most recent stable kernel now is hardened-sources-3.8.3. Others still available are hardened-sources versions 3.2.40-r1 and 2.6.32-r156.
The support for XATTR_PAX is still progressing, but a few issues have come up. One is that non-hardened systems are seeing warnings about pax-mark not being able to set the XATTR_PAX on tmpfs since vanilla kernels do not have the patch to support user.* extended attribute namespaces for tmpfs. A second issue is that the install application, as provided by coreutils, does not copy extended attributes. This has impact on ebuilds where pax markings are done before the install phase of a package. But only doing pax markings after the install phase isn’t sufficient either, since sometimes we need the binaries to be marked already for test phases or even in the compile phase. So this is still something on the near horizon.
Most likely the necessary tools will be patched to include extended attributes on copy operations. However, we need to take care only to copy over those attributes that make sense: user.pax does, but security ones like security.evm and security.selinux shouldn’t as those are either recomputed when needed, or governed through policy. The idea is that USE=”pax_kernel” will enable the above on coreutils.
The SELinux support in Gentoo has seen a fair share of updates on the userland utilities (like policycoreutils, setools, libselinux and such). Most of these have already made the stable tree or are close to be bumped to stable. The SELinux policy also has been updated a lot: most changes can be tracked through bugzilla, looking for the sec-policy r13 whiteboard. The changes can be applied to the system immediately if you use the live ebuilds (like selinux-base-9999), but I’m planning on releasing revision 13 of our policy set soon.
Some of the “early adopter” problems we’ve noticed on Gentoo Hardened have been integrated in the repositories upstream and are slowly progressing towards the main Linux kernel tree.
All hardened profiles have been moved to the 13.0 base. Some people frowned when they noticed that the uclibc profiles do not inherit from any architecture-related profile. This is however with reason: the architecture profiles are (amongst other reasons) focusing on the glibc specifics of the architecture. Since the profile intended here is for uclibc, those changes are not needed (nor wanted). Hence, these are collapsed in a single profile.
For SELinux, the SELinux handbook now includes information about USE=”unconfined” as well as the selinux_gentoo init script as provided by policycoreutils. Users who are already running with SELinux enabled can just look at the Change History to see which changes affect them.
A set of tutorials (which I’ve blogged about earlier as well) have been put online at the Gentoo Wiki. Next to the SELinux tutorials, an article pertaining to AIDE has been added as well as it fits nicely within the principles/concepts of the System Integrity subproject.
If you don’t do it already, start following @GentooHardened ;-)