Simplicity is a form of art...

A SELinux policy for incron: default set

I finished the last post a bit with a cliffhanger as incrond is still not working properly, and we got a few denials that needed to be resolved; here they are again for your convenience:

type=AVC msg=audit(1368734110.912:28353): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=9716 comm="incrond …

A SELinux policy for incron: the incrond daemon

With incrontab_t (hopefully) complete, let's look at the incrond_t domain. As this domain will also be used to execute the user (and system) commands provided through the incrontabs, we need to consider how we are going to deal with this wide range of possible permissions that it might …

A SELinux policy for incron: new types and transitions

So I've shown the iterative approach used to develop policies. Again, please be aware that this is my way of developing policies, other policy developers might have a different approach. We were working on the incrontab command, so let's continue with trying to create a new user incrontab:

$ incrontab -e …

A SELinux policy for incron: basic set for incrontab

Now that our regular user is allowed to execute incrontab, let's fire it up and look at the denials to build up the policy.

$ incrontab --help

That doesn't show much does it? Well, if you look into the audit.log (or avc.log) file, you'll notice a lot of denials …

A SELinux policy for incron: the basic skeleton

So, in the previous post I talked about incron and why I think moving it into the existing cron policy would not be a good idea. It works, somewhat, but is probably not that future-proof. So we're going to create our own policy for it.

In SELinux, policies are generally …

A SELinux policy for incron: what does it do?

In this series of posts, we'll go through the creation of a SELinux policy for incron, a simple inotify based cron-like application. I will talk about the various steps that I would take in the creation of this policy, and give feedback when certain decisions are taken and why. At …

Why oh why does a process run in unlabeled_t?

If you notice that a process is running in the unlabeled_t domain, the first question to ask is how it got there.

Well, one way is to have a process running in a known domain, like screen_t, after which the SELinux policy module that provides this domain is …

The weird "audit_access" permission

While writing up the posts on capabilities, one thing I had in my mind was to give some additional information on frequently occurring denials, such as the dac_override and dac_read_search capabilities, and when they are triggered. For the DAC-related capabilities, policy developers often notice that these capabilities …

Commandline SELinux policy helper functions

To work on SELinux policies, I use a couple of functions that I can call on the shell (command line): seshowif, sefindif, seshowdef and sefinddef. The idea behind the methods is that I want to search (find) for an interface (if) or definition (def) that contains a particular method or …

Looking at the local Linux kernel privilege escalation

There has been a few posts already on the local Linux kernel privilege escalation, which has received the CVE-2013-2094 ID. arstechnica has a write-up with links to good resources on the Internet, but I definitely want to point readers to the explanation that Brad Spengler made on the vulnerability.

In …