After 9 posts, it's time to wrap things up. You can review the final results online (incron.te, incron.if and incron.fc) and adapt to your own needs if you want. But we should also review what we have accomplished so far...
We built the start of an entire policy for a daemon (the inotify cron daemon) for two main types: the daemon itself, and its management application incrontab. We defined new types and contexts, we used attributes, declared a boolean and worked with interfaces. That's a lot to digest, and yet it is only a part of the various capabilities that SELinux offers.
The policy isn't complete though. We defined a type called
incron_initrc_exec_t but don't really use it further. In practice, we
would need to define an additional interface (probably named
incron_admin) that allows users and roles to manage incron without
needing to grant this user/role
sysadm_r privileges. I leave that up
to you as an exercise for now, but I'll post more about admin interfaces
and how to work with them on a system in the near future.
We also made a few assumptions and decisions while building the policy that might not be how you yourself would want to build the policy. SELinux is a MAC system, but the policy language is very flexible. You can use an entirely different approach in policies if you want. For instance, incron supports launching the incrond as a command-line, foreground process. This could help users run incrond under their privileges for their own files - we did not consider this case in our design. Although most policies try to capture all use cases of an application, there will be cases when a policy developer did either not consider the use case or found that it infringed with his own principles on policy development (and allowed activities on a system).
In Gentoo Hardened, I try to write down the principles and policies that we follow in a Gentoo Hardened SELinux Development Policy document. As decisions need to be taken, such a document might help find common consensus on how to approach SELinux policy development further, and I seriously recommend that you consider writing up a similar document yourself, especially if you are going to develop policies for a larger organization.
One of the deficiencies of the current policy is that it worked with the
unmodified incron version. If we would patch incron so that it could
change context on executing the incrontab files of a user, then we can
start making use of the default context approach (and perhaps even
enhance with PAM services). In that case, user incrontabs could be
launched entirely from the users' context (like
instead of the
system_u:system_r:incrond_t or transitioned
system_u:system_r:whatever_t contexts. Having user provided commands
executed in the system context is a security risk, so in our policy we
would not grant the incron_role to untrusted users - probably only
sysadm_t and even then he probably would be better with using the
The downside of patching code however is that this is only viable if upstream wants to support this - otherwise we would need to maintain the patches ourselves for a long time, creating delays in releases (upstream released a new version and we still need to reapply and refactor patches) and removing precious (human) resources from other, Gentoo Hardened/SELinux specific tasks (like bugfixing and documentation writing ;-)
Still, the policy returned a fairly good view on how policies can be developed. And as I said, there are still other things that weren't discussed, such as:
- Build-time decisions, which can change policies based on build
options of the policy. In the reference policy, this is most often
used for distribution-specific choices: if Gentoo would use one
approach and Redhat another, then the differences would be separated
- Some calls might only be needed if another policy is loaded. I think
all calls made currently are part of base modules, so can be
expected to be available at all times. But if we would need
something like icecast_signal(incrond_t), then we would need to
put that call inside a
optional_policy(`...')statement. Otherwise, our policy would fail to load because the icecast SELinux policy isn't loaded.
- We could even introduce specific statements like dontaudit or neverallow to fine-tune the policy. Note though that neverallow is a compile-time statement: it is not a way to negate allow rules: if there is one allow that would violate the neverallow, then that module just refuses to build.
Furthermore, if you want to create policies to be pushed upstream to the reference policy project, you will need to look into the StyleGuide and InterfaceNaming documents as those define the order that rules should be placed and the name syntax for interfaces. I have been contributing a lot to the reference policy and I still miss a few of these, so for me they are not that obvious. But using a common style is important as it allows for simple patching, code comparison and even allows us to easily read through complex policies.
If you don't want to contribute it, but still use it on your Gentoo
system, you can use a simple ebuild to install the files. Create an
ebuild (for instance
selinux-incron), put the three files in the
files/ subdirectory, and use the following ebuild code:
# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 # $Header$ EAPI="4" IUSE="" MODS="incron" BASEPOL="2.20130424-r1" POLICY_FILES="incron.te incron.fc incron.if" inherit selinux-policy-2 DESCRIPTION="SELinux policy for incron, the inotify cron daemon" KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
When installed, the interface files will be published as well and can then be used by other modules (something we couldn't do in the past few posts) or by the selocal tool.