I've come across a few posts on forums (Gentoo and elsewhere) asking why Gentoo doesn't make security-related patches on the tree. Some people think this is the case because they do not notice (m)any GLSAs, which are Gentoo's security advisories. However, it isn't that Gentoo doesn't push out security fixes - it is a matter of putting the necessary human resources against it to write down the GLSAs.
Gentoo is often quick with creating the necessary ebuilds for newer versions of software. And newer versions often contain security fixes that mitigate problems detected in earlier versions. So by keeping your system up to date, you get those security fixes as well. But without GLSA, it is difficult to really know which packages are necessary and which aren't, let alone be aware that there are potential problems with your system.
I already captured one of those needs through the cvechecker application, so I took a step further and wrote an extremely ugly script (it's so ugly, it would spontaneously become a joke of itself when published) which compiles a list of potential CPEs (identifiers for products used in CVEs) from the Gentoo package list (ugliness 1: it assumes that the package name is the product name). It then tries to assume what the version of that software is based on the ebuild version (ugliness 2: it just takes the a.b.c number). Then, it lists the CVEs affiliated with a particular package, and checks this list with the list of CVEs from an earlier version (ugliness 3: it requires the previous, vulnerable version to still be in the tree). If one of the CVEs has "disappeared", it will report that the given package might fix that CVE. Oh, and if the CVE has a CPE that contains more than just a version, the script ignores it (ugliness 4). And it probably ignores a lot of other things as well while not checking the input (ugliness 5 and higher).
But if we ignore all that, what does that give for the Gentoo portage tree for the last 7 days? In other words, what releases have been made on the tree that might contain security fixes (and that do comply with the above ugliness)?
app-editors/emacs-23.4-r5 might fix CVE-2010-0825 app-editors/emacs-24.2-r1 might fix CVE-2012-0035 app-editors/emacs-24.2-r1 might fix CVE-2012-3479 dev-lang/python-2.6.8-r1 might fix CVE-2010-3492 dev-lang/python-2.6.8-r1 might fix CVE-2011-1521 dev-lang/python-2.6.8-r1 might fix CVE-2012-0845 dev-lang/python-2.6.8-r1 might fix CVE-2012-1150 dev-lang/python-2.6.8-r1 might fix CVE-2008-5983 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2009-5052 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2009-5053 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2009-5054 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4722 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4723 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4724 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4725 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4726 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2010-4727 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2012-4277 dev-php/smarty-2.6.27 might fix CVE-2012-4437 media-sound/rhythmbox-2.97 might fix CVE-2012-3355 net-im/empathy-3.6.3 might fix CVE-2011-3635 net-im/empathy-3.6.3 might fix CVE-2011-4170 sys-cluster/glusterfs-3.3.1-r2 might fix CVE-2012-4417 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0788 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0789 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0791 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0792 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0793 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0794 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0795 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0796 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0797 www-client/seamonkey-2.17 might fix CVE-2013-0800
As you can see, there is still a lot of work to remove bad ones (and add matches for non-default ones), but at least it gives an impression (especially those that have CVEs of 2012 or even 2013 are noteworthy), which is the purpose of this post.
It would be very neat if ebuilds, or the package metadata, could give pointers on the CPEs. That way, it would be much easier to check a system for known vulnerabilities through the (publicly) available CVE databases as we then only have to do simple matching. A glsa-check-ng (what's in a name) script would then construct the necessary CPEs based on the installed package list (and the metadata on it), check if there are CVEs against it, and if there are, see if a newer version of the same package is available that has no (or fewer) CVEs assigned to it.
Perhaps someone can create a GSoC proposal out of that?